During the impeachment hearing, President Clinton tried to rationalize his
case to the grand jury by asking the question: “That depends on what your
definition of ‘is’ is!” His distinction of present and past tense was
perceived by many to be quite contrived. Be that as it may, there is
still some important distinctions to be made between different uses of the word
“is.” And the implications here can be huge. But first, let's
understand the distinction.
1. Socrates is the teacher of Plato.
2. Socrates is tall.
Sentence (1) is an identity statement. The use of “is” is for identity purposes. Socrates is identical with that person who happens to be the teacher of Plato. Sentence (2) is not an identity statement. It is what grammarians call predication, and what I will call attribution. Socrates is not identical to all things tall (there are many redwoods that are not Socrates, for instance), but rather Socrates merely has the attribute or property of being tall. There are actually 2-3 other uses of “is,” that I won't talk about.
Around the world today it is common to hear phrases like: To be Thai is to be Buddhist. To be Swedish is to be Lutheran. To be Malaysian (according to the constitution!) is to be Muslim. To be Italian is to be Roman Catholic.
These phrases show what anthropologists have insisted on for years. That so many cultures (unlike many western cultures) do not draw sharp and distinct lines between their family, community, religious, national and political life. For most cultures in fact, it all flows together in a seamless whole. To break off one aspect is to undo the rest. This reality tempts many anthropologists to make the case that these phrases show how the religious categories of many other cultures actually function as ethnic/cultural categories as well. These cultures, they say, do not see these categories as distinct.
But first, let's use what we've learned and ask this question: Is the use of “is” in each of these statements, the “is” of identity or the “is” of attribution? A moment's reflection shows that it is the “is” of attribution. We know this because if being Thai and being Buddhist mark out the same category (identical), then there would not be any non-Thai Buddhists. But of course there are: Tibetans, Japanese, Richard Gere =) , even the Buddha himself. Every Thai person knows this. This is not surprising to them. Yet what do they mean when they might say “to be Thai is to be Buddhist”? They mean that the attribute of being Buddhist always comes with being Thai. In their minds it is an inseparable attribute. Inseparable, not identical. Do you see the distinction here?
Look at a Venn Diagram.
Substitute (A) for Buddhist (B) for Thai. When a Thai person says “To be Thai is to be Buddhist” is she implying the diagram on the left or the right? I am arguing it is actually the diagram on the right. She is saying all Thai people are within the category of being Buddhist. But she will readily admit not all Buddhists are Thai. The categories are not identical and interchangeable. That's because she is using the “is” of attribution, not identity. And it is a particular type of attribute that is easy to confuse with identity –an inseparable attribute. Second, it would actually be a meaningless statement if it was identity! If being Buddhist means nothing more than the cultural designation of “being Thai”, then all the statement would mean is “to be Thai is to be Thai” –which is trivially true. It is a meaningless tautology –certainly not what its advocates seem to mean.
Similarly, when a Malaysian goes to Canada on business or goes on the hajj and meets non-Malaysian Muslims, is he befuddled? Since he believes the statement “to be Malaysian is to be Muslim,” does he have a category for non-Malaysian Muslims? Of course he does. And the reason it is possible in his mind, is only because that statement is not an identity statement for him. It is attribution. In his mind, what he truly believes is that Malaysians have an inseparable attribute of only being Muslim. Inseparable, not identical. If he believed those categories were identical he would have no comprehension of a non-Malaysian Muslim.
Take the concepts of faith and works in the bible. Classic theology insists that faith and works are inseparable within the life of a true believer. Those with true faith will have true works. They will always flow together. They are inseparable. Now, does that mean they are identical? If they necessarily flow together, does that mean faith and works must be the same thing? No, of course not. Though they are inseparable, they are still distinct things.
This distinction can re-clarify some of the blurring that anthropologists are sensing with non-western cultural and religious categories. It is true that these categories are not used in the same way that they are used in Europe and North America. They are not compartmentalized into their own hemisphere. Culture and religion are organically tied to one another. But being tied to one another (inseparable) is different than being identical. And for anthropologists that are inclined to see identity here, I think, they underestimate the subtle nuances that non-western cultures really do have under the surface.
1. Socrates is the teacher of Plato.
2. Socrates is tall.
Sentence (1) is an identity statement. The use of “is” is for identity purposes. Socrates is identical with that person who happens to be the teacher of Plato. Sentence (2) is not an identity statement. It is what grammarians call predication, and what I will call attribution. Socrates is not identical to all things tall (there are many redwoods that are not Socrates, for instance), but rather Socrates merely has the attribute or property of being tall. There are actually 2-3 other uses of “is,” that I won't talk about.
Around the world today it is common to hear phrases like: To be Thai is to be Buddhist. To be Swedish is to be Lutheran. To be Malaysian (according to the constitution!) is to be Muslim. To be Italian is to be Roman Catholic.
These phrases show what anthropologists have insisted on for years. That so many cultures (unlike many western cultures) do not draw sharp and distinct lines between their family, community, religious, national and political life. For most cultures in fact, it all flows together in a seamless whole. To break off one aspect is to undo the rest. This reality tempts many anthropologists to make the case that these phrases show how the religious categories of many other cultures actually function as ethnic/cultural categories as well. These cultures, they say, do not see these categories as distinct.
But first, let's use what we've learned and ask this question: Is the use of “is” in each of these statements, the “is” of identity or the “is” of attribution? A moment's reflection shows that it is the “is” of attribution. We know this because if being Thai and being Buddhist mark out the same category (identical), then there would not be any non-Thai Buddhists. But of course there are: Tibetans, Japanese, Richard Gere =) , even the Buddha himself. Every Thai person knows this. This is not surprising to them. Yet what do they mean when they might say “to be Thai is to be Buddhist”? They mean that the attribute of being Buddhist always comes with being Thai. In their minds it is an inseparable attribute. Inseparable, not identical. Do you see the distinction here?
Look at a Venn Diagram.
Substitute (A) for Buddhist (B) for Thai. When a Thai person says “To be Thai is to be Buddhist” is she implying the diagram on the left or the right? I am arguing it is actually the diagram on the right. She is saying all Thai people are within the category of being Buddhist. But she will readily admit not all Buddhists are Thai. The categories are not identical and interchangeable. That's because she is using the “is” of attribution, not identity. And it is a particular type of attribute that is easy to confuse with identity –an inseparable attribute. Second, it would actually be a meaningless statement if it was identity! If being Buddhist means nothing more than the cultural designation of “being Thai”, then all the statement would mean is “to be Thai is to be Thai” –which is trivially true. It is a meaningless tautology –certainly not what its advocates seem to mean.
Similarly, when a Malaysian goes to Canada on business or goes on the hajj and meets non-Malaysian Muslims, is he befuddled? Since he believes the statement “to be Malaysian is to be Muslim,” does he have a category for non-Malaysian Muslims? Of course he does. And the reason it is possible in his mind, is only because that statement is not an identity statement for him. It is attribution. In his mind, what he truly believes is that Malaysians have an inseparable attribute of only being Muslim. Inseparable, not identical. If he believed those categories were identical he would have no comprehension of a non-Malaysian Muslim.
Take the concepts of faith and works in the bible. Classic theology insists that faith and works are inseparable within the life of a true believer. Those with true faith will have true works. They will always flow together. They are inseparable. Now, does that mean they are identical? If they necessarily flow together, does that mean faith and works must be the same thing? No, of course not. Though they are inseparable, they are still distinct things.
This distinction can re-clarify some of the blurring that anthropologists are sensing with non-western cultural and religious categories. It is true that these categories are not used in the same way that they are used in Europe and North America. They are not compartmentalized into their own hemisphere. Culture and religion are organically tied to one another. But being tied to one another (inseparable) is different than being identical. And for anthropologists that are inclined to see identity here, I think, they underestimate the subtle nuances that non-western cultures really do have under the surface.
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